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GAY AND LESBIAN APPLICANTS TO THE
BAR: EVEN LORD DEVLIN COULD NOT
DEFEND EXCLUSION, CIRCA 2000
JOEL JAY FINER -
Some months ago, the Editors of this Journal solicited an historic "Brief,"
to be published anonymously (at the author's request) -Brief Against
Homophobia at the Bar: To Law School Dean: Mid 1960s, 10 Colum. J.
Gender & Law 63 (2000). The present article: a) explores the numerous
legal, social, and attitudinal developments since that Brief was written (in
the mid-1960s); b) develops tests and criteria for evaluating the "good
moral character" requirements for admission to the practice of law
(particularly as impacting on sexual practices, propensities, and gender
orientation, lawful or unlawful in different jurisdictions at different times);
and c) relates developments in attitudes and practices of Bar examiners. 1
In 1957, the publication of a report to Parliament, the Wolfenden
Repo , which recommended the repeal of laws criminalizing private
homosexual conduct between consenting adults, 2 sparked an intensely
debated controversy in political philosophy and jurisprudence. The issue: is
society justified in criminalizing behavior which, although causing no
secular harm, transgresses widely held moral values? The principal
proponent of morals legislation was Lord Patrick Devlin, who responded to
the Wolfenden recommendation with a paper disputing the report's
premises-that criminal law had no proper business punishing private
immorality.3 Devlin argued that the maintenance of a shared public sense of
morality is essential to maintaining the cohesion of society:
* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law; B.B.A., City College of
New York; M.A., LL.B., Yale University.
1 This last aspect of Professor Finer's contribution herein, relies significantly, but
by no means exclusively, on Professor Deborah Rhode's seminal article on the subject of the
"good moral character" requirement (e.g., the instant article suggests additional analogies,
and otherwise expands on and updates that premiere study: Deborah L. Rhode, Moral
Character as a Professional Credential, 94 Yale L.J. 491, 516 (1985)).
2 See Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, The Wolfenden
Repor cmt. 247 (1957).
3 Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals 45 Proceedings of the British
Academy I (1959).
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If men and women try to create a society in which there is no
fundamental agreement about good and evil they will fail ... the
society will disintegrate. For society is not something that is kept
together physically; it is held by the invisible bonds of common
thought.4
Lord Devlin contended that the maintenance of the common moral
bonds of society necessitated the expression of these morals through laws
pertaining to a widely-shared abhorrence of certain behavior, including
homosexual conduct:
I do not think one can ignore disgust if it is deeply felt and not
manufactured. Its presence is a good indication that the bounds of
toleration are being reached. Not everything is to be tolerated. No
society can do without intolerance, indignation, and disgust; they
are the forces behind the moral law.
5
For Devlin, where such virtually universal moral outrage was present, not
even the values of liberty or privacy could trump the case for translating
that outrage into criminal prohibitions.
Oxford Professor of Jurisprudence H.L.A. Hart, a philosophical
successor to the libertarianism of John Stuart Mill, vigorously opposed
Devlin's views. In this country, the most distinguished proponent of the
Mill-Hart philosophical position is Professor Ronald Dworkin.6 Hart,
Dworkin, and those of a similar persuasion, and Lord Devlin and those of
his persuasion, produced a prodigious body of legal, moral, and political
philosophy.7
While I am of the Mill-Hart-Dworkin persuasion, the Devlin-Hart
disagreement will not be pursued herein,8 for one thesis of this Article is
4 Id. at 10.
5 Id. at 17 (emphasis added).
6 See Ronald Dworkin, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 Yale L.J.
986 (1966).
7 For scholarship in support of Hart's views, see, for example, Graham Hughes,
Morals and the Criminal Law, 71 Yale L.J. 662 (1961) (book review) and Robert S.
Summers, Book Review, 38 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1201 (1963). For scholarship favoring Devlin's
position, see, for example, Eugene Rostow, The Enforcement of Morals 1960 Cambridge
L.J. 174.
8 Nor do I address the question whether the Constitution prohibits restrictions on
liberty that are justified by neither the Mill-Hart prerequisites nor the Devlin prerequisites,
other than to note that where there is neither a secular harm nor a broad consensus
232 [Vol. 10:2
HeinOnline  -- 10 Colum. J. Gender & L. 232 2000-2001
Gay and Lesbian Applicants to the Bar
that in the present moral climate, even supporters of Lord Devlin's
philosophy could not justify criminalizing private sexual conduct between
consenting adults. I look at this specifically in the context of admission to
the Bar.
At the outset, let me state my reasons for the subtitle of this
article-i.e., "Even Lord Devlin Could Not Defend Exclusion," in the moral
climate of the year 2000. Devlin, in his major work on this subject,9
conceded that his thesis was subject to certain important exceptions or
qualifications. 0 The most significant of these, for present purposes, is that
when, over time, "[t]he limits of tolerance shift"" as to particular behavior,
society would not be required or even justified in continuing to criminalize
that conduct.1
2
Critical to Devlin's thesis defending the enforcement of morality
was the presence of a strong and pervasive public demand for enforcement,
a demand generated by almost universal disgust and abhorrence, such that
the very idea of legal tolerance was itself intolerable.
As I examine, in Part I, the developments since the mid-1960s with
respect to the legal, constitutional, social, and reputational status of
homosexuals, it becomes abundantly clear that the conditions for even the
debatable Devlinian justification for prohibiting consensual same-sex
intimacies are simply not present. Rather, there have been major "shifts" in
the "limits of tolerance" away from condemnation and outrage, and toward
toleration and acceptance.
The Hart-Devlin debate focused on the legitimacy of
criminalization. In 1986, the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick
13
upheld the criminalization of adult consensual private homosexual sodomy.
Ten years later, the Romer 14 decision found that discrimination against
homosexuals as a class violated the Equal Protection Clause because such
condemning the behavior as outrageous, courts would need to strain mightily indeed to
discern the necessary rational basis for restricting liberty. (And as Romer teaches, animus is
the antithesis of a rational basis.)
9 Devlin, supra note 3.
10 See id. at 18.
1 Id.
12 See id.
13 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
14 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
2001] 233
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discrimination lacked a rational basis and was motivated by an animus
against the disadvantaged group. The discussion which follows contends
that the necessary social attitudinal basis for Devlin's views has dissipated,
that there is no rational basis for adverse treatment of gay or lesbian
applicants to the Bar, 5 and that any feelings of "disgust," "indignation" or
"intolerance" by Bar examiners toward homosexual applicants is the very
animus condemned by Romer as an untenable-indeed constitutionally
reproachable-basis for discrimination.
In recent decades, there have been many significant developments
in the constitutional, legal, and social status of homosexual men and
women. The first part of this commentary will document these
developments. Thereafter, the "good moral character" requirement for
admission to the practice of law in virtually all jurisdictions will be
examined in order to gain further insight into the actual or potential risks of
inquiry, investigation, and/or exclusion based on criminal convictions,
unprosecuted homosexual practices (both where criminalized and where not
criminalized), and gay or lesbian status itself.16
I
There have been developments at the constitutional, federal, and
state levels, as well as in the judicial and legislative spheres. In flux have
been laws and judicial interpretations concerning marriage and domestic
partnership, employment, housing, education, military status, insurance,
hate crimes, sodomy statutes, public health regulations, adoption, child
custody, visitation, etc. Outside the law itself, organized religion has
passionately debated questions such as the ordination of gays and lesbians
as clergy and the solemnization of committed partnerships between gays
and lesbians. As this piece is nearing completion, the Miami Herald reports
that the Central Conference of American Rabbis, which represents Reform
rabbis in the United States and Canada, decided that its members- 1800
rabbis-may perform religious rituals to solemnize gay and lesbian
15 That is, the absence of a nexus to attributes indicative or predictive of future
unethical practice of law.
16 Of course the constitutional considerations relevant to assessing the validity of
criminalization sound in due process, while those bearing on employment opportunities or
public certification directly implicate the Equal Protection Clause. There are interesting and
significant relationships between the Bowers decision, focusing on the former, and the later
decision in Romer focusing more on status discrimination or targeting.
[Vol. 10:2234
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unions.17
The phenomena that seem to have had significant impact on the
interests of gay and lesbian Americans, and on public perceptions and
attitudes toward them, have been: "gay liberation"-particularly in San
Francisco in the 1960s and 70s; the blight of AIDS since the early 1980s;
the Bowers decision upholding the criminalization of homosexual
sodomy;18 the rise of the political and religious right; developments
regarding same-sex marriage; the Romer case striking down a state
constitutional amendment which restricted political rights of homosexuals;'
9
President Clinton's general, albeit uneven, support and implementation of
fairer treatment for gays and lesbians in the military; the increased openness
and assertiveness of homosexuals; and changes in the manner in which gay
men and lesbians and their lifestyles are depicted in popular media.
A. Constitutional Status/Federal and State
In 1986, the Supreme Court in Bowers v. Hardwick struck a heavy
blow to gay and lesbian aspirations by upholding the constitutionality of a
state criminal sodomy statute (at least in its application to consensual
homosexual relations). Ten years later, in Romer, a decision not
mentioning Bowers, a majority of the Court invalidated a Colorado
constitutional amendment barring homosexuals from obtaining legislative
protection against acts of discrimination as a specified class. In Romer,
the Court found an absence of rational basis for this discriminatory
classification, which it viewed as impermissibly motivated by anti-
homosexual animus.20
Some scholars interpret the holding in Romer to mean that
discrimination against gay people almost always lacks a rational basis (and,
by implication, as necessarily overruling Bowers),2' other scholars view it
as prohibiting discrimination against gays only when the law in question
17 Reform Rabbis Back Blessings of Gay Unions, Miami Herald, Mar. 30, 2000, at
Al.
18 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. at 196.
19 Romer v. Evans 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
20 See id. at 632.
21 See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Bowers v. Hardwick Diminished. 68 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 373 (1997) (claiming that Hardwick cannot be reconciled with
Romer; the latter strongly suggesting that discrimination against homosexuals
cannot survive even a rational basis test.)
2352001]
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cannot be linked to some public-regarding justification,22 and still others
view Romer as opening the door to the potential constitutional treatment of
homosexuals as a suspect or quasi-suspect class (thus requiring that
discriminatory laws be subject to greater scrutiny than they are under the
rational basis test.)
In post-Romer litigation, courts have tended to find that the Equal
Protection Clause does not require courts to invalidate laws discriminating
against gays where such laws can be said to be rationally related to a
legitimate public objective. 3
The consensus among scholars, although not universal, is that at the
least, Romer prohibits discrimination based on nothing more than an
animus toward the status of homosexuality. Courts are seeing at least that
much in Romer as well.
For example, a recent decision of a federal district court in Ohio
declared that a school board's non-renewal of a homosexual teacher's
contract, if shown to be "motivated solely by animus towards that group...
[would] necessarily . . . [violate] the Equal Protection Clause, because a
'desire to effectuate one's animus against homosexuals can never be a
legitimate governmental purpose. "
24
Although the Equal Protection Clause has not been judicially read
as affording for lesbians and gay men the same constitutional protection
afforded to men and women, based on their gender as such, most of such
cases were decided before Romer 25 and read Bowers as precluding
22 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving
Things Undecided, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 6, 101 (1996) (stating that Hardwick is not implicitly
overruled by Romer; and discrimination against gays is prohibited where, and only where, it
cannot be linked to some public-regarding justification (i.e., where based only on animus)).
23 See, e.g., Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128
F.3d 289, 292-93 (6th Cir. 1997) (upholding amendment of Cincinnati City Charter that
removed homosexuals from present or future protections by municipal anti-discrimination
ordinances as rationally related to city's interest in avoiding costs of investigating
complaints); Richenberg v. Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 260-61 (8th Cir. 1996) (upholding military
discharge of homosexual as rationally based on presumption that self-declared homosexuals
have propensity to commit homosexual acts).
24 Glover v. Williamsburg Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 20 F. Supp. 2d 1160,
1169 (S.D. Ohio 1998), (citing Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 874 (6th Cir.
1997) (citing Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. at 1629)) (emphasis added). The court also noted
that "lilt is inconceivable that Bowers stands for the proposition that the state may
discriminate against individuals on the basis of their sexual orientation." Id. at 1169. But cf
Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997)
25 See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464-65 (7th Cir. 1989); High
Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990);
236 [Vol. 10:2
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constitutional treatment of homosexuals as a suspect category, which would
require at least quasi-strict scrutiny of discriminatory laws or practices.
Romer retains considerable potential significance in the future of equal
protection and even due process analysis.
26
B. State Constitutional Developments
The Supreme Court of Hawaii interpreted that state's constitution
as requiring that marriage licenses be issued to same-sex couples absent a
compelling justification, which the State failed to demonstrate in
subsequent litigation on remand.27 Although the Hawaii electorate
subsequently empowered its legislature to amend its constitution so as to
preclude recognition of same-sex marriages, 28 legislation was enacted
providing same-sex couples with many of the benefits afforded to married
couples.
The Vermont Supreme Court has construed that state's constitution
as requiring that same-sex couples receive the "common benefits and
protections that flow from marriage under [Vermont law]" (requiring and
permitting the Vermont legislature to elect either to grant marriage licenses
to same-sex couples or bring about substantial equality of rights and
privileges). 29
Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1074-76 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Padula v. Webster,
822 F.2d 97, 102-03 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
26 For an insightful and provocative disquisition of the doctrinal and societal
impact of Romer on the Bowers holding, see Andrew M. Jacobs, Romer Wasn't Built In A
Day: The Subtle Transformation In Judicial Argument Over Gay Rights, 5 Wis. L. Rev. 893
(1996).
27 Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), on remand sub nom. Baehr v. Miike,
Civ. No. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996).
28 See Hawaii, Alaska Don't Want Same-Sex Marriage, Orlando Sentinel, Nov. 5,
1998, at A17. The Hawaii Constitution now states that "[t]he legislature shall have the
power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples." Haw. Const., art. I, § 23. After the
voters acted, the Hawaii Supreme Court dismissed as moot the constitutional challenge to the
prohibition against same-sex marriage. See Baehr v. Miike No. 20371, 1999 Haw. LEXIS
391 (Haw. Dec. 9, 1999).
29 Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999).
2001 ] 237
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As of this writing the Vermont House of Representatives has
approved a bill creating "civil unions," "setting the stage for the state to
adopt the most sweeping set of rights for same-sex couples in the
country. 30
C. The Crime of Sodomy/State Laws and Constitutions
Since 1980 courts in seven states have struck down sodomy laws
under state constitutions, 3' and since the drafting of the Model Penal Code
in 1961 (declining to criminalize consensual sodomy), at least twenty-six
states have repealed such criminal laws.32 Currently eighteen states forbid
sodomy.
33
30 Carey Goldberg, Vermont's House Backs Wide Rights for Gay Couples, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 17, 2000, at Al.
31 See State v. Smith, 729 So. 2d 648 (La. App. 1999); People v. Onofre, 415
N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980); Commonwealth v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992);
Commonwealth v. Bonadio, 415 A.2d 47 (Pa. 1980); Campbell v. Sundquist, 926 S.W.2d 250
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1996); Post v. State, 715 P.2d 1105 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986).
According to Powell v. State, 510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1998) (striking down law
forbidding consensual sodomy as violating the Georgia Constitution):
Adults who "withdraw from the public gaze" . .. to engage in private
unforced sexual behavior are exercising a right "embraced within the
right of personal liberty.". . . We cannot think of any other activity that
reasonable persons would rank as more private and more deserving of
protection from governmental interference than unforced, private, adult
sexual activity.
Id.
Cf State v. Morales, 826 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (declaring sodomy
statute invalid), rev'd, 869 S.W.2d 941 (Tex. 1994) (reversing on grounds that lower court
lacked necessary jurisdiction).
On the other hand, appellate courts in North Carolina and Rhode Island have
rejected state constitutional challenges to sodomy laws. See State v. Chiaradio, 660 A.2d
276 (R.I. 1995); State v. Poe 252 S.E.2d 843 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979).
32 Evan Wolfson & Robert S. Mower, When the Police Are in our Bedrooms,
Shouldn't the Courts Go in After Them?: An Update on the Fight Against "Sodomy" Laws,
21 Fordham Urb. L.J. 997, 1042 (1994).
33 See National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, The Right to Privacy in the U.S.-
January 2001, at http://www.ngltf.org/downloads/sodomymap0l01.pdf. Prohibitions in
thirteen of those states apply on their face to heterosexual and homosexual sodomy. Id.
HeinOnline  -- 10 Colum. J. Gender & L. 238 2000-2001
2001] Gay and Lesbian Applicants to the Bar 239
D. Laws Addressing Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gays
Laws prohibiting discrimination against homosexuals are now on
the books of the District of Columbia and ten states-California,
Connecticut, Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin,34 and in municipalities or
counties in at least twenty-six other states, 35 including the cities of Phoenix,
Atlanta, Denver, Chicago, New Orleans, Boston, Detroit, Minneapolis, St.
Louis, New York, Cleveland, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Austin,
Charlottesville, and Seattle.36
E. Private Employment by Major Employers
While over 300 major employers offer domestic partner benefits to
unmarried partners (extended health insurance and/or bereavement and
other benefits), 37 the great majority of gay and lesbian workers in
34 See Cal. Lab. Code § 1102.1 (1997); Conn. Gen. Stat. §§ 46a-81c (1997); D.C.
Code Ann. § 1-2512 (1997); Haw. Rev. Stat. §§ 368-1, 378-2 (1996); Mass. Ann. Laws ch.
272, § 98 (Law. Co-op. 1996); Minn. Stat. §§ 363.03, 363.12 (1996); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 354-A:7, :8 (1998); N.J. Rev. Stat. §§ 10:2-1, :5-4, :5-12 (1996); R.I. Gen. Laws §§ 28-5-
2, 28-5-7 (1996); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 3, § 495 (1996); Wis. Stat. § 111.36 (1996).
35 See Thomas H. Barnard & Timothy J. Downing, Emerging Law on Sexual
Orientation and Employment 29 U. Mem. L. Rev. 555, 557-58 & n.7 (1999); American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), State and Local Laws Protecting Lesbians and Gay Men
Against Workplace Discrimination, at http://www.aclu.org/issues/gay/gaylaws.html (last
updated Oct. 1998). For examples of local ordinances protecting gays and lesbians from
discrimination, see, for example., Los Angeles, Cal., Municipal Code ch. IV, art. 12, §§
49.70-49.80 (1979); Administrative Code of the City of New York §8-107.
36 ACLU, supra note 35. For an analysis of most of the statutes and ordinances
referred to in notes 34 and 35, supra, see Developments in the Law: Employment
Discrimination (Statutory Protection for Gays and Lesbians in Private Employment) 109
Harv. L. Rev. 1625, 1625-47 (1996).
37 James P. Baker, Equal Benefits For Equal Work? The Law of Domestic Partner
Benefits, 14 Lab. Law. 23 (1998).
[A] trend is emerging among private employers to offer domestic partner
benefits to their employees. The trend is being led by some of the
nation's most respected corporations, including Microsoft, Levi Strauss,
Xerox, IBM, Walt Disney, Auto Desk, Bank of America and Chevron,
all of whom offer, or plan to offer, health benefits to the domestic
partners of their employees. Additionally, nationwide more than 40
governments (from the City of San Francisco to the State of Vermont),
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committed relationships do not receive such benefits.
F. Family Law
In areas of family law other than marriage as such, gays and
lesbians have slowly but steadily been overcoming negative stereotypes and
moral obloquy. In matters of child custody and visitation rights, gay and
lesbian divorced spouses, whose contact with their children was once (and
in some cases still is) treated as presumptively detrimental to the child's
best interests, are increasingly likely to find courts open-minded regarding
the impact of gay/lesbian parenting or visitation on the welfare of children.
Courts are more likely today to require, in showing of a harmful impact on
a child from custody or contact with a gay parent, a nexus between the
parent's sexual orientation and an actual detriment to the child. 38 Absent
such a nexus, courts apply a variety of factors to decide custody/visitation
issues, such as the level of care provided to the child, the degree of
attachment of the child to each parent, the stability of each spouse, which
parent has functioned as the primary caregiver, etc.
While progress has been made, there are still far too many courts
that will weigh homosexuality negatively, explicitly, or often implicitly,39
concluding that the gay or lesbian spouse is less suitable to fulfill the
parental role or less stable, or more likely to subject the child to an immoral
upbringing or to expose the child to social stigma and ridicule.4°
Judges across the country have been increasingly willing to approve
adoptions with two "mothers" or "fathers," giving full parental rights to the
non-biological parent, as they have long done for heterosexual stepparents.
Such adoptions are no longer rare for gay couples in the District of
and 130 colleges and universities (from Stanford University to the
University of Iowa), offer domestic partner benefit programs.
Id.
38 See, e.g., S.N.E. v. R.L.B., 699 P.2d 875 (Alaska 1985).
39 See generally Susan J. Becker, Child Sexual Abuse Allegations Against a
Lesbian or Gay Parent In a Custody or Visitation Dispute: Battling the Overt and Insidious
Bias of Experts and Judges, 74 Denv. U. L. Rev. 75 (1996).
40 See, e.g., S.E.G. v. R.A.G., 735 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). For other
cases discriminating against homosexual parents in custody disputes see, for example, S. v.
S., 608 S.W.2d 64 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980); G.A.v.D.A. 745 S.W.2d 726 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987);
Roe v. Roe, 324 S.E.2d 691 (Va. 1985).
[Vol. 10:2240
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Columbia and about twenty states.41
G. Hate Crimes
In eighteen states, hate crime laws specifically include crimes based
on sexual orientation, in four states and the District of Columbia the laws
include crimes based on sexual orientation and gender identity, and sixteen
states with hate crime laws do not specify sexual orientation.42 Federal hate
crime legislation, now under consideration by Congress and the subject of
legislative hearings, would include crimes motivated by the sexual
orientation of the victim.
H. Setbacks for Gay and Lesbian Rights
In response to the Hawaii decisions finding that its state
constitution, as then written, compelled issuance of marriage licenses to
same-sex couples, Congress enacted the Defense of Marriage Act.43 This
statute provides, in essence, that: 1) no federal benefits or entitlements
based on marriage would be afforded to partners in a same-sex marriage;
and 2) states had no obligation to afford full faith and credit to same-sex
marriages contracted lawfully in other states.
As noted, the Hawaiian electorate effectively overruled the state
judicial opinions interpreting the Hawaii Constitution as requiring issuance
of marriage licenses to same-sex couples.44
In the same vein, over twenty states have enacted legislation
declaring that only marriages between partners of the opposite sex will be
recognized as valid.
At least one anti-gay rights ordinance has survived scrutiny
notwithstanding Romer. The Sixth Circuit, reviewing an amendment of the
Cincinnati City Charter denying municipal benefits to homosexual partners
of city employees, found that the provision had a rational basis-to save the
city the administrative expenses necessary to investigate and defend against
41 Joan Biskupic, For Gays, Tolerance Translates To Rights; Legal Gains Reflect
Shift in Attitudes Wash. Post, Nov. 5, 1999, at Al.
42 See National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Hate Crimes in the U.S. - January
200 1, at http://www.ngltf.org/downloads/hatemapO101 .pdf.
43 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738C (West Supp. 1998) (foreclosing interpretation of any
federal statutory provision referring to marriage or spousehood as applying to same-sex
couples.)
44 See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
2001]
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a charge of discrimination.4 5
1. Military Status
Under a policy known as "Don't Ask, Don't Tell," gay and lesbian
members of the armed forces have been discharged or denied re-enlistment
in cases where they have either engaged in homosexual activity, or revealed
themselves to be gay or lesbian. Courts upholding such adverse actions
have found justification (a rational basis) in 1) a presumed propensity of
homosexuals to commit homosexual acts; and 2) the need to promote unit
cohesion, reduce sexual tension, and foster instinctive obedience, unity,
commitment, and esprit de corps.46
While the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy was instituted in 1994
partly in order to make it easier for homosexuals to serve in the military, in
practice gay and lesbian troops have been discharged from the military "at a
far higher rate than before the policy went into effect."4 7 Moreover,
harassment, assaults, and even murders of homosexuals in the military
have, until very recently, been met with tepid responses and even willful
blindness on the part of supervisory or command level officers.
Recently President Clinton expressed disappointment with the
implementation of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, calling it "out of
whack."' 8  Soon thereafter, the Pentagon announced that it was instituting
45 Equal. Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc., 128 F.3d at 292-93. See, however,
also from the Sixth Circuit, Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d. 856 (6th Cir. 1997).
46 Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998). See also Phillips v. Perry,
106 F.3d 1420 (9th Cir. 1997); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915 (4th Cir. 1996) (adding the
rationale that it was legitimate for Congress to proscribe homosexual acts based on its
conclusions that a military force should be as free as possible of sexual attachments and
pressures).
47 Philip Shenon, Pentagon Moving to End Abuses Of 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell'
Policy, N.Y. Times, Aug. 13, 1999, at Al.
48 President Admits 'Don't Ask' Policy Has Been Failure N.Y. Times, Dec. 12,
1999 at Al. According to the article:
President Clinton reminded his audience that the original intent was that
people would not be rooted out, that they would not be questioned out,
that this would be focused on people's conduct. If they didn't violate the
code of conduct and they didn't tell, their comings and goings, the mail
they got, the associates they had-those things would not be sufficient to
keep them out of the military, or subject them to harassment.
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training sessions for every member of the military in order to raise the
sensitivity of personnel, starting in boot camp and continuing throughout
each person's military career. 49 The purpose is to substantially reduce or
eliminate anti-gay violence and harassment, as well as to increase overall
tolerance and respect. In pursuit of that objective, penalties have been
increased for hate crimes in the military, including those targeting
homosexuals. 50
I. Public Attitudes
What all of this shows is that while homosexuals and
homosexuality have not achieved full, pervasive, and nationwide equality of
legal treatment, their legal status has substantially improved in many
respects. This is the case, notwithstanding the existence of continuing
political and legislative opposition (sometimes successful), to extending
various rights to gay people.
Changes in the law both reflect and influence public opinions and
attitudes. Today there is nothing approaching Lord Devlin's justification
for the "enforcement of morals"-i.e., a national consensus of "moral
outrage" and "indignation"; a pervasive revulsion of homosexuality as
something "intolerable and disgusting."
Instead there has been increasing public acceptance of gays and
lesbians.5 About half of the population now finds homosexuality or a
homosexual lifestyle acceptable:
When asked by Gallup whether "homosexuality should be
considered an acceptable alternative lifestyle or not," the
proportion of Americans who chose "acceptable" rose from one-
third (34% in 1982) to one-half (50% in 1999). Similarly,
Yankelovich Partners found that the percentage of Americans
who feel "lifestyles . . . such as homosexual relationships" are
"not acceptable at all" dropped from a clear majority in 1978
(59%) to a clear minority in 1988 (33%).52
49 Shenon, supra note 47.
50 Clinton Adds Stiffer Penalties to Military Code for Bias Crimes, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 7, 1999, at A17.
51 See generally Kenneth Sherrill & Alan Yang, From Outlaws to In-Laws; Anti-
gay Attitudes Thaw. 11 The Public Perspective, Jan. 20, 2000, at 20.
52 Id. at 20 (footnote omitted); see also Frank Newport, Some Change over Time
in American Attitudes towards Homosexuality, but Negativity Remains Gallup News
Service, Mar. 1, 1999, at http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr990301b.asp. The
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While in some areas of the country and sectors of the population
homophobia still clearly exists, 53 the extent of disapproval has dropped
substantially in recent years.
With respect to attitudes toward employment opportunities, "the
evidence is clear: overwhelming majorities are supportive, particularly over
the past decade. 54
Gallup reports 83% of Americans favored equal [employment]
rights in 1999 (three separate surveys done between 1993 and
1996 showed support between 81 and 84%), a substantial
increase from a baseline of 56%, reported by Gallup in 1977.
Gallup's numbers are confirmed in a Princeton Survey Research
Associates (PSRA) trend that asks whether there "should or
should not be . . . equal rights for gays in terms of job
opportunities" (83 to 84% supported equal rights in three separate
surveys between 1996 and 1998).'5
While the Bowers Court in 1986 ignored the arguments for the
Mill-Hart position, today, however, with respect to same-sex intimate
relationships, there is a demonstrable absence of empirical evidence
supporting Lord Devlin's debatable justification for legislating against
deontological "immorality."
percentage holding the view that sexual relations between consenting adults of the same sex
is always wrong has dropped substantially as well, after over a decade at a high level
(between seventy and seventy-five percent chose "always wrong" in nine separate surveys
spanning from 1980 to 1991). By 1996, that figure had dropped to fifty-six percent. Sherrill
& Yang, supra note 51, at 20.
A poll conducted by the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force "found that though
disapproval of homosexuality had dropped by nearly 20 percentage points since its peak of
75 percent in the late 1980's, it was still 56 percent in 1996, the most recent year examined
on that question." Carey Goldberg, Acceptance of Gay Men and Lesbians Is Growing, Study
Says N.Y. Times, May 31, 1998, at A2 1.
Fifty-seven percent of the people surveyed in a Washington Post/Kaiser Family
Foundation/Harvard University poll in 1998 said homosexuality was unacceptable.
Biskupic, supra note 41.
53 See, e.g., GOP Prayer Breakfast Attendees Denounce Gay Marriage: Speakers
Liken Same-Sex Unions To Nazism, Demand End to Tolerance Ventura County Star
(Ventura County, Ca.), Feb. 8, 2000, at A04; see generally Biskupic, supra note 41.
54 Sherrill & Yang, supra note 51, at 20.
5 Id.
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II
A. Homosexuality and the Requirement of "Good Moral Character"
for Admission to the Bar
Pre-admission screening of potential lawyers for "good moral
character" is required by every jurisdiction 6  Several major questions
about the screening process exist;57 those to be discussed herein include:
What perceived moral failings or "vices" are appropriate for character
committees to take into account? What have courts, character committees,
and Bar examiners, charged with screening out those lacking "good moral
character," actually said or done with respect to indications of
homosexuality, homosexual intimacies, and non-marital heterosexual
conduct?5
8
56 See generally Rhode, supra note 1.
57 These include, for example, procedural due process issues, issues regarding the
reliability of sources of information examiners receive, the capacity of character committees
to make probability judgments about the likelihood of repetition of misconduct or
sufficiently sound judgments about whether a miscreant has been rehabilitated.
58 The very practice of pre-admission moral screening has been called into
question. See, e.g., Patrick L. Baude, An Essay on the Regulation of the Legal Profession
and the Future of Lawyers' Characters, 68 Ind. L.J. 647 (1993):
[I]t seems hard to see that the requirements serve any straightforward
purpose. The proportion of applicants denied admission to the bar is
minute-best estimated at one in five hundred. Yet the requirement
persists in every state and commands a fairly large amount of time and
money.
The obvious explanations for the continuation of character and fitness
inquiries are inadequate to explain the present state of affairs.... [T]he
regulation of the bar is made of two almost incompatible components.
On the one hand is the project of convincing potential customers that
their lawyers will not cheat or otherwise harm them. This is an essential
part of marketing for any business.
The other project is the Weberian enterprise of justifying the privileges
of lawyers in the political and economic sphere. These privileges are
finally justified by appeal to the idea that lawyers are committed, in the
words of the Preamble to the American Bar Association's Model Rules
of Professional Conduct, to "cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its
use for clients, . . . to improve the law ... and to exemplify the legal
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What are the risks that gay or lesbian Bar candidates will suffer
some adverse action, such as intrusive personal inquisitions, significant
delays in gaining admission, and even exclusion from the profession? 59
A typical statement of the determination to be made by screening
authorities is whether:
[a] reasonable man could fairly find that there were substantial
doubts about [the applicant's] "honesty, fairness and respect for
the rights of others and for the laws of the state and nation." 6
Having closely perused scholarly works61 and numerous judicial
opinions, I suggest there are four factors which could create risks of adverse
action for gay or lesbian candidates:
1) the very vagueness, elasticity, and abuse-inviting nature of
the term "good moral character";
2) references, in expressions of "standards," to furthering or
maintaining the "repute of the Bar" or the good "image" of the
profession;
3) the criminality in the jurisdiction of the particular conduct,
even absent any conviction in the candidate's history; and
62 34) the per se, or at least presumptive,6  exclusion of
profession's ideals of public service." This second project is by and
large a failure or, at best, an illusion.
Id at 649-50 (footnotes omitted).
59 When relating actions by Bar committees and courts, adverse actions against
practicing lawyers, such as reprimand, suspension, and disbarment will also be noted.
60 Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, 264 (1957) (setting forth the
definition advanced by counsel representing the California Bar).
61 See, e.g. Patrick L. Baude, An Essay on the Regulation of the Legal Profession
and the Future of Lawyers' Characters, 68 Ind. L.J. 647 (1993); Rhode, supra note I.
Students' works making significant contributions include Richard R. Arnold, Jr.,
Presumptive Disqualification and Prior Unlawful Conduct: The Danger of Unpredictable
Character Standards for Bar Applicants, 1997 Utah L. Rev. 63 (1997); Maureen M. Carr,
The Effect of Prior Criminal Conduct on the Admission to Practice Law: The Move to More
Flexible Admission Standards 8 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 367 (1995); The Professional Image
Standard: An Untold Standard Of Admission To The Bar, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 1015 (1992);
Michael D. White, Good Moral Character and Admission to the Bar: A Constitutionally
Invalid Standard? 48 U. Cin. L. Rev. 876 (1979).
62 See Arnold, Jr., supra note 61, at 64.
63 Id.
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applicants who have actually been convicted of crime.
1. Moral character/moral turpitude
Undertaking and analyzing the results of the most comprehensive
investigation into the past and present practices of screening committees
and Bar examiners, Professor Deborah Rhode observed in the Yale Law
Journal that:
Throughout its history, the moral fitness requirement has
functioned primarily as a cultural showpiece. In that role, it has
excommunicated a diverse and changing community, variously
defined to include not only former felons, but women, minorities,
adulterers, radicals, and bankrupts. Although the number of
applicants formally denied admission has always been quite
small, the number deterred, delayed, or harassed has been more
substantial. In the absence of meaningful standards or
professional consensus, the filtering process has proved
inconsistent, idiosyncratic, and needlessly intrusive. 64
The vague terms "moral character" and "moral turpitude, 65 fail to
give guidance to those who need to interpret such language (e.g., applicants,
lawyers, bar examiners, courts), confer excessive discretion on those who
authoritatively construe and apply them, and, of course, confer the power to
gravely abuse such discretion.
As Justice Black, writing for the Court, observed:
The term "good moral character" has long been used as a
qualification for membership in the Bar and has served a useful
purpose in this respect. However the term, by itself, is unusually
ambiguous. It can be defined in an almost unlimited number of
ways for any definition will necessarily reflect the attitudes,
experiences, and prejudices of the definer. Such a vague
qualification, which is easily adapted to fit personal views and
predilections, can be a dangerous instrument for arbitrary and
64 Rhode, supra note 1, at 493-94.
65 Discussing the meaning of "moral turpitude," Justice Jackson declared: "If we
go to the dictionaries, the last resort of the baffled judge, we learn little except that the
expression is redundant, for turpitude alone means moral wickedness or depravity and moral
turpitude seems to mean little more than morally immoral." Jordan v. De George, 341 U.S.
223, 234 (1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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discriminatory denial of the right to practice law.66
a. Appropriate Considerations in Screening Bar Candidates
Bar examiners are concerned with misconduct that basically falls
into three categories. First, the Bar is concerned with misconduct that will
impact the welfare of clients, other participants in the lawyers' world
(judges, juries, witnesses, other attorneys), and the institution of justice
itself.
Given the special fiduciary obligations of attorneys, traits that bear
on the lawyer-client relationship understandably receive considerable
attention. The qualities of honesty, trustworthiness, and fair-dealing capture
much of this concern. Where the candidate has engaged in acts such as
fraud,67  larceny,68 embezzlement, 69  academic dishonesty, °  or
misrepresentation,7' the candidate's admission to the Bar might pose a
threat to clients who entrust their legal affairs to such an attorney. Financial
misfeasance is of particular concern to character committees since lawyers
are frequently entrusted with business and monetary affairs within a wide
range of concerns of potential clients. The character flaws within this
subset of misconduct have a fairly direct bearing on an attorney's
worthiness of the trust and confidence of clients, and on her capacity to
satisfy the legitimate expectations of others within the legal profession.
Bar examiners also consider moral character important for the
protection of the fairness and integrity of the justice system itself. Prior acts
of corruption, bribery, perjury, or obstruction of justice72 are obviously of
legitimate concern.
66 Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. at 262 (emphasis added).
67 See, e.g., Lark v. West, 289 F.2d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
68 See, e.g., Fla. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs Re R.D.I., 581 So. 2d 27 (Fla. 1991).
69 See, e.g,. People ex rel. Deneen v. Gilmore, 73 N.E. 737 (I11. 1905).
70 See, e.g., In re the Application of Harold Kearl Widdison, 539 N.W.2d 671
(S.D. 1995).
71 Cf State ex rel. Bd. of Law Exam'rs v. Podell, 207 N.W. 709 (Wis. 1926).
72 See, e.g., In re Rappaport, 558 F.2d 87 (2d Cir. 1977) (obstructing justice, giving
false testimony); cf Lubetzky v. State Bar of Cal., 815 P.2d 341 (Cal. 1991) (en banc)
(instituting harassing litigation).
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These necessary virtues are summed up by the term "integrity."
Evidence of lack of integrity, depending on its nature and strength, warrants
concerns about unethical lawyering. In short, the strongest case for
investigation and/or negative action is misconduct pertinent to the special
obligations of lawyers as lawyers.
A second sphere of arguably 73 legitimate professional concern may
be misconduct that manifests propensities which threaten the personal
security of those who would interact with attorneys. Past acts and/or
convictions 74 of homicide,75 rape, assault,76 or robbery,77 or instances of
exploitation of children 78 or other vulnerable persons 79 are matters within
the legitimate focus of Bar examiners, 80 even though the risks they create
73 There is room here for a thoughtful analysis of whether or when the gatekeepers
of the legal profession may justifiably inquire into convictions or unprosecuted instances of
this sort of conduct, for example, not directly bearing on the virtues necessary to the
functioning of a lawyer as a lawyer. See infra note 80.
74 The approach to actual convictions differs among the states., Some jurisdictions
automatically and permanently disqualify those convicted of certain offenses. Others
presumptively disqualify those convicted of all or certain specified felonies. Some set a
minimum time period between the date of conviction and eligibility for the Bar. In states
with presumptive disqualification, various factors are taken into account; several states use
the guidelines of the ABA. See generally Arnold, Jr., supra note 61.
75 See, e.g., In re Dortch, 486 S.E.2d 311 (W. Va. 1997); In re Moore 303 S.E.2d
810 (N.C. 1983).
76 See, e.g., In re Vandenbossche 724 N.E.2d 405 (Ohio 2000), In re Farmer 131
S.E. 661 (N.C. 1926).
77 See, e.g., In re Jeb F., 558 A.2d 378 (Md. 1989).
78 See, e.g., In re Christie, 574 A.2d 845 (Del. 1990) (suspending an attorney who
had engaged in sexually inappropriate and criminal activities with two teenage minors in
supplying them with alcohol and engaging in exhibitionism-showing them "X-rated" video
tapes and masturbating in their presence. He had been convicted of various related crimes.).
79 See, e.g., In re T.J.S. 692 A.2d 498 (N.H. 1997) (conviction of felonious sexual
assault of two students when employed as teacher); In re Hicks, 20 P.2d 896 (Okla. 1933)
(lawyer disbarred for having a sexual relationship, resulting in pregnancy, with a retarded
woman-a dwarf weighing about 60 pounds); In re Okin, 272 A.D. 607 (N.Y. App. Div.
1947) (disbarment of attorney who operated a brothel).
80 Inquiry into this sort of misconduct--criminality of a violent or abusive
nature-seems justified by the fact that some attorneys will practice independently, or are
not vetted by the firms that hire them.
The lawyer-client relationship naturally involves closeness, in a proximate
physical sense, and in a psychological sense; and in any event involves reliance and
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are not directly or uniquely an aspect of the practice of law.8
b. Dubious Bases For Exclusion
More troublesome is a third category of behaviors: misconduct that
has little or nothing to do with endangering clients or their legitimate
expectations, endangering other actors in the legal system, or jeopardizing
the effective functioning of the justice system itself.
Certain conducts that have at times produced adverse Bar actions
are far from evidencing a danger to denizens of the lawyer's world. For
example, just how relevant is it that the applicant or practicing attorney
committed adultery82 or was convicted of seduction 83-behaviors which
have generated adverse actions and harsh condemnations?
8 4
dependency by one person upon another. The importance of "public confidence" in the
lawyer encompasses those who, as part of the lawyer's world, become vulnerable; they have
a legitimate expectation that they can feel comfortable and safe physically, as well as in their
financial and other legal interests.
81 The issues here have to do with the substantive guidelines, procedural processes,
the extent of expertise, and the commitment of resources necessary to make determinations
(or use rebuttable or irrebutable presumptions) relating to probability of future crimes.
82 Grievance Comm. of Hartford County Bar v. Broder, 152 A. 292 (Conn. 1930).
83 In re Wallace, 19 S.W.2d 625 (Mo. 1929) ("The relation created by an
engagement to marry is one of confidence and trust. An abuse of that relation for the
satisfaction of sexual desires is not only contrary to good morals, but is an act of baseness
and depravity. We have no doubt that seduction under promise of marriage involves moral
turpitude."). Compare State v. Byrkett, 3 Ohio N.P. 28 (1895) (seduction held not grounds
for disbarment).
84 See State v. McClaugherty, 10 S.E. 407 (W. Va. 1889); In re Rothrock, 106 P.2d
907 (Cal. 1940).
What is the threat represented by acts or convictions of adultery (which few states
criminalize and some courts have found cannot constitutionally be criminalized) or seduction
(which the vast majority of states no longer treat as criminal)? In terms of professional
morality, can faithlessness in one sphere (marital) be readily translated into significant
faithlessness to a client? Marital infidelity may signify a breakdown of the relationship
and/or a history of mutual provocative behaviors. The marriage relationship, being so
different from professional relationships, may have nothing significant to say about loyalty
to clients.
The repeal of seduction laws may not conclusively indicate the total irrelevance of
such behavior. But there are seductions and there are seductions. Determinations by
unschooled Bar examiners of subtle, exploitative, manipulative character traits would be
inherently unreliable. In any event the issue of sexual relations between attorney and client,
in certain circumstances undoubtedly unethical, in others, on the line, and in a few situations
perhaps of little ethical significance, is by these complexities an additional demonstration of
HeinOnline  -- 10 Colum. J. Gender & L. 250 2000-2001
Gay and Lesbian Applicants to the Bar
Several judicial decisions and opinions have emphasized the need
for a demonstrable nexus between ostensibly "immoral" behavior and
qualifications for public employment or professional licensing in order for
such behavior to legally justify exclusion, dismissal, or other negative
action.
Chief Judge Bazelon, writing for the District of Columbia Circuit in
Norton v. Macy, held that an off-duty homosexual advance by a federal
employee was not a ground for dismissal; he rejected, at the outset, the
contention that such "immorality" warranted the adverse job action:
A pronouncement of "immorality" tends to discourage careful
analysis because it unavoidably connotes a violation of divine,
Olympian, or otherwise universal standards of rectitude.
So construed, "immorality" covers a multitude of sins. Indeed, it
may be doubted whether there are in the entire Civil Service
many persons so saintly as never to have done any act which is
disapproved by the "prevailing mores of our society. 85
Regarding prospective or practicing attorneys, similar points have
been emphasized by state and federal courts:
[A] lawyer should so conduct himself that the work of the Courts
and the administration of justice will not suffer by reason of his
continuing to hold a license to practice. This does not mean that
the Court has the function or right to regulate the morals, habits
or private lives of lawyers, who like other citizens are free to act
and to be responsible for their acts, but when the morals, habits
or conduct of a lawyer demonstrate unfitness to practice law or
adversely affect the proper administration of justice, then the
Court may have the duty to suspend or revoke the privilege to
the untenability of expecting or permitting Bar Examiners to predict ethical conduct from
ambiguous behaviors.
85 Norton v. Macy 417 F.2d 1161, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
A 1969 opinion for the California Supreme Court by Justice Tobriner concludes in
no uncertain terms that private behavior not bearing on the fitness to carry out one's
professional or vocational obligations may not be a basis for exclusion, dismissal, or
disbarment. Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ. 461 P.2d 375 (Cal. 1969) (holding that a
teacher's homosexual actions "cannot constitute immoral or unprofessional conduct or
conduct involving moral turpitude ... unless those actions indicate his unfitness to teach").
Id. at 220.
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practice law in order to protect the public.8 6
We take it to be a sound principle that the court has no regulatory
power over the private life of members of the Bar, and that it
cannot exclude them from practice for acts in that capacity unless
they be such as to clearly demonstrate their unfitness to longer
enjoy the privileges of the profession.87
It would be carrying the doctrine [requiring good moral
character] too far to hold that an attorney must be free from every
vice, and to strike him from the roll of attorneys because he may
indulge in irregularities affecting to some extent his moral
character, when such delinquencies do not affect his personal or
professional integrity. To warrant a removal, his character must
be bad in such respects as show him to be unsafe and unfit to be
entrusted with the powers and duties of his profession8
Acts alleged to involve "moral turpitude" do not warrant
disbarment unless it "may fairly be inferred [from those acts] that ... [the
attorney's] moral character is ...such as will probably lead him into an
abuse of the privileges of his profession, or a disregard of his duties either
to the court or to his clients. 89
Indeed, the Supreme Court, in overturning a state's exclusion of a
Bar candidate because of his past membership in the Communist Party and
his arrest record, declared that:
A State cannot exclude a person from the practice of law or from
any other occupation in a manner or for reasons that contravene
the Due Process or Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. A State can require high standards of qualification,
such as good moral character or proficiency in its law, before it
admits an applicant to the bar, but any qualification must have a
rational connection with the applicant's fitness or capacity to
practice law.
90
86 In re Gorsuch, 75 N.W.2d 644, 648 (1956) (emphasis added).
87 Bartos v. United States District Court, 19 F.2d 722, 724 (8th Cir. 1927)
(emphasis added).
88 McClaugherty, 10 S.E. at 410 (emphasis added).
89 In re Rothrock 106 P.2d at 910.
90 Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam'rs, 353 U.S. 232, 238-39 (1957) (footnotes and
citations omitted) (emphasis added)
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These categories result in problematic differences in determinations
about the sorts of misconduct, past and predicted, that have such "rational
connections."
It would seem then that sound principles mandate a real nexus
between the conduct in question, and a) the safety and security of clients
and their interests or b) the safety, security, and legitimate interests of other
people and institutions in the lawyers' world. When acts committed under
reasonable expectations of liberty or privacy become the basis of denying
an otherwise competent applicant, demonstration of a real linkage between
misconduct and legitimate concerns of the Bar should be required.
2. Furthering the Repute and Good Image of the Bar
Beyond the protection of clients and the public and the proper
functioning of the institutions of justice, courts and leaders of the Bar have
often asserted another role or function that screening and disciplinary
processes serve: the protection of the image and reputation of the profession
itself.9'
Professor Rhode, analyzing the results of her research, surveys, and
interviews of Bar examiners in several jurisdictions, observes that these
objectives-the protection of the reputation of the profession and the
attainment of a favorable public image-serve substantially to further the
economic well-being and perceived social status of the lawyers'guild.92
91 See, e.g., In re Cason, 294 S.E.2d 520, 523 n.5 (Ga. 1982) ("Fitness Board
serves the members of the bar in upholding public confidence."); In re Childress, 561
N.E.2d 614, 622 (I11. 990) (holding that certification would "tend to undermine the integrity
of the profession.").
In denying reinstatement to a disbarred attorney who blamed his financial
misconduct on cocaine use, the Court observed, "his use of cocaine increases the danger he
presents to the public, the courts, and the reputation of the legal profession." In re
Demergian, 768 P.2d 1069, 1074 (Cal. 1989) (emphasis added).
See also M.A. Cunningham, Comment, The Professional Image Standard: An
Untold Standard of Admission to the Bar 66 Tul. L. Rev. 1015 (1992).
92 Rhode, supra note 1, at 510-11.
Professor Rhode finds that from one perspective, the certification process "[is] an
integral part of the [profession's] general effort to legitimate the profession's regulatory
autonomy and economic monopoly." Id. at 511.
Weeding out the unworthy ...helps to legitimate a status in which
practitioners have strong psychological as well as economic stakes ... to
enhance its members' social standing. . . . In [the view of Bar
examiners], a single unethical lawyer brings "disrepute to the whole
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When image and reputation enhancement seek precedence over
human values such as privacy, even Justice Scalia (a vigorous dissenter in
Romer and supporter of the Bowers decision) has expressed strong
disapproval. Dissenting from a decision upholding a requirement that
employees of the U.S. Customs Service be subject to random drug-testing,
including urinalysis, Justice Scalia declared that given the absence of any
history of agents' drug abuse or resulting harms to the public, the image of
the agency could not justify the invasion of employees' privacy:
What better way to show that the Government is serious about its
"war on drugs" than to subject its employees on the front line of
that war to this invasion of their privacy and affront to their
dignity? To be sure, there is only a slight chance that it will
prevent some serious public harm resulting from Service
employee drug use, but it will show to the world that the Service
is "clean, " and-most important of all-will demonstrate the
determination of the Government to eliminate this scourge of our
society! I think it obvious that this justification is unacceptable;
that the impairment of individual liberties cannot be the means of
making a point; that symbolism, even symbolism for so worthy a
cause as the abolition of unlawful drugs, cannot validate an
otherwise unreasonable search.93
profession," penalizing the thousand who slave "mightily and
righteously." ... To the extent that character review can "screen[ ]out
.. moral risks before they are admitted to practice..., the profession's
priceless reputation" is well-served.
Id.at 510-11 (citations omitted).
Indeed, this emphasis on "repute" and "image" of the bar, was used
earlier in the twentieth century to exclude a range of persons deemed
"undesirable," including women, Jews, those from the "lower classes,"
the foreign-born, and "non-conformists of various hues: radicals,
religious fanatics, divorcees, fornicators, and any individual who
challenged the profession's anti-competitive ethical canons."
Id. at 500-02.
93 Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab 489 U.S. 656, 680 (1989)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
While the majority in Van Raab did find that the danger to the service and the
public from weapon-carrying employees who might be using illicit drugs was a weighty
enough concern to justify limited invasion of modesty concerns with regard to excretionary
functions, and some invasion of medical privacies, there are no comparable public dangers
presented by homosexual applicants. The privacy interests invaded are considerable,
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The Bars' emphasis of the image and reputation of the legal
profession as a service industry (with its history of self-serving, profit-
oriented, prejudiced, and class-based exclusions), does not itself justify the
imposition of exclusionary or disciplinary sanctions, particularly when
based on private sexual intimacies without secular impact.94
It is no wonder that the invitation to abuse through the use of the
term "morality" to maintain or advance the repute and image of the Bar9 5
(or "public confidence") has led, particularly in the first half of the
twentieth century, to questionable if not completely untenable exclusions
and sanctions.96
involving as they do private, intimate sexual conduct, expressing affections and needs close
to the core of personal identity.
94 In Norton v. Macy, an agency failed to discharge a civil service employee who
had made a homosexual pass at a man outside of the workplace. Chief Judge Bazelon
remarked that:
[His] continued employment ... might "turn out to be embarrassing to
the agency" in that "if an incident like this occurred again, it could
become a public scandal on the agency. " The assertion of such a
nebulous "cause" [as the possibility of embarrassment to the Agency]
poses perplexing problems for a review proceeding which must accord
broad discretion to the Commission. We do not doubt that NASA
blushes whenever one of its own is caught in flagrante delictu; but if the
possibility of such transitory institutional discomfiture must be
uncritically accepted as a cause for discharge which will "promote the
efficiency of the service," we might as well abandon all pretense that the
statute provides any substantive security for its supposed beneficiaries.
A claim of possible embarrassment might, of course, be a vague way of
referring to some specific potential interference with an agency's
performance; but it might also be a smokescreen hiding personal
antipathies or moral judgments which are excluded by statute as
grounds for dismissal. A reviewing court must at least be able to discern
some reasonably foreseeable, specific connection between an employee's
potentially embarrassing conduct and the efficiency of the service....
We think the unparticularized and unsubstantiated conclusion that such
possible embarrassment threatens the quality of the agency's
performance is an arbitrary ground for dismissal.
417 F.2d at 1167 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
95 As well as pursuing the ambiguous goal of maintaining "public confidence in
the bar."
96 Professor Rhode has this to report about early twentieth century cases:
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In recent years, however, there have been few reported instances of
exclusion or imposition of disciplinary sanctions for purely deontological
"immorality." Indeed, absent criminalization of the conduct in the
jurisdiction, the cases, particularly in the past quarter century, tend to treat
such conduct as of little or no relevance.
So, for example, in 1979 the Virginia Supreme Court, reviewing a
case in which a female Bar applicant was cohabiting with a man outside the
institution of marriage, concluded that though such "living arrangement
may be unorthodox and unacceptable to some segments of society, this
conduct bears no rational connection to her fitness to practice law. It cannot,
therefore, serve to deny her the certificate." 97
But there perhaps remains some potential for such abuse. Professor
Rhode's empirical research generated these observations:
Attitudes toward sexual conduct such as cohabitation or
homosexuality reflect... diversity. Some bar examiners do not
regard that activity as "within their purview," unless it becomes a
"public nuisance" or results in criminal charges .... In [some]...
jurisdictions, . . .cohabitation and homosexuality can trigger
extensive inquiry and delay, and some slight possibility of denial.
In the remaining states, examiners reported few applications
[They] centered on prostitution and fornication, and generated a set of
somewhat murky moral mandates. Commercial relationships with fallen
women were permissible to a point; those who paid money for sexual
favors were often forgiven, while those who accepted money for abetting
such activities were purged from the profession. Singled out for
particular condemnation was a black attorney who managed a house of
ill repute where "white girls ... consorted with negroes" and smoked
opium. To a 1929 Missouri court, seduction by an unfulfilled promise to
marry constituted "baseness and depravity" mandating disbarment. By
contrast, in the preceding year, New Jersey justices found fornication
with a fifteen-year-old to warrant only a six-month suspension, in light
of the victim's previously dissolute life and the attorney's reputation as
an "upright and moral man." Seducing one's secretary was discreditable
but not disabling; seducing the wife of a war hero was unforgivable.
While sexual advances toward the secretary were dismissed as part of the
"weaknesses, passions and frailties possessed in some degree by all
mankind," the adulterous liaison with a prominent society matron
(notwithstanding its subsequent legitimation through marriage)
constituted an act of "inherent baseness without alleviation or excuse."
Rhode, supra note 1, at 553 (footnotes omitted).
Cord v. Gibb, 254 S.E.2d 71, 73 (Va. 1979).
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presenting evidence of "living in sin" or homosexuality.
According to one Board of Bar Examiners president, "Thank God
we don't have much of that in Missouri." How these individuals
would view such conduct if brought to their attention remains
unclear.98
3. Commission of Criminal Acts and Convictions for Crimes
While there is minimal risk today of Bar examiners taking adverse
action based on non-criminal, victimless intimate conduct, or being upheld
if they did, in the few jurisdictions that still criminalize homosexual
sodomy, a gay or lesbian applicant is at a higher level of jeopardy. While
only six states automatically exclude applicants with felony convictions, in
the other forty-four states, such applicants must overcome an explicit or
operational presumption of unfitness. 99 As one commentator has observed,
"'this logic licenses inquiry into any illegal activity, no matter how remote
or minor.'
'1°°
There are considerable (and unpredictable) disparities in the
treatment of prior criminal acts.' 0 ' Some states have adopted ABA
guidelines setting out factors relevant to "assigning weight and significance
to prior conduct," while other states rely on their own guidelines (critical
language in most of the guidelines, ABA and non-ABA, is so vague as to be
of little use).
Perhaps the principal animating idea underlying the adverse
treatment of criminal conduct, whatever its nature, is the notion that
98 Rhode, supra note 1, at 539 (footnotes omitted). See also id. at 578-80.
99 Carr, supra note 61, at 383-90; see also Arnold, Jr., supra note 61.
oo Car, supra note 61, at 384.
101 Rhode, supra note 1, at 539.
She also notes:
Exclusion necessarily yields highly idiosyncratic determinations of what
acts are sufficiently damning to warrant non-certification. Violation of a
fishing license statute ten years earlier was sufficient to cause one local
Michigan committee to decline certification. But, in the same state, at
about the same time, other examiners on the central board admitted
individuals convicted of child molesting and conspiring to bomb a public
building.
Id. at 538.
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commission of any crime, whether or not prosecuted, 10 2 demonstrates a
"disrespect for law," thus "self-evidently" manifesting unfitness to practice
law. 10 3 So, a person who has been convicted of a crime, any crime (e.g.,
consensual sodomy), bears the burden of demonstrating that he has
rehabilitated himself.1°n
Some courts, however, reject the argument that absent proof of
rehabilitation criminality requires exclusion, emphasizing even here, the
necessity of a connection, a nexus, between the crime (or non-prosecuted
criminal act) and fitness for the practice of law.
Of particular significance to this issue are cases in New York and
Florida involving prior acts of sodomy. In 1973, the New York Court of
Appeals reversed a lower appellate court that had given undue weight to
applicant's prior conviction (and disbarment) in Florida, for public
sodomy. 05
And more recently, the Supreme Court of Florida has held that
"private non-commercial sex acts between consenting adults are not
102 See, e.g., In re K.S.L., 495 S.E.2d 276 (Ga. 1998) (unprosecuted entry of
automobiles with intent to steal).
103 See Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 353 U.S. 252, where the Court focused on
whether a "reasonable man could fairly find that there were substantial doubts about [the
applicant's] 'honesty, fairness and respect for the rights of others and for the laws of the state
and nation."' Id. at 264. To this effect see, for example, In re Christie 574 A.2d 845 (Del.
1990): "As officers of the Court, members of the Bar are expected to respect and uphold the
law. '[L]awyers who act illegally diminish the stature of the legal professional and reduce
public confidence in the rule of law."' Id. at 851 (citation omitted).
See also, In re Gahan, 279 N.W.2d 826, 829 (Minn. 1979); Florida Bd. of Bar
Exam'r ex rel N.R.S., 403 So. 2d 1315 (1981), in which Justice Alderman dissented from the
holding that private consensual sodomy between adults was not a basis for exclusion:
Lawyers are officers of the court, and, in the eyes of the public, they are
a part of the machinery of the law. Even minor violations of law by
lawyers tend to lessen public confidence in the legal profession, which in
turn lessens public confidence in our judicial system and ultimately the
law itself. Obedience to law exemplifies respect for law. To lawyers
especially, respect for the law should be more than a platitude.
Id. at 1318 (Alderman, J., dissenting).
104 See, e.g., In re Jaffee, 806 P.2d 685 (Or. 1991); In re Davis, 313 N.E.2d 363
(Ohio 1974). See generally Carr, supra note 61.
105 In re Kimball 301 N.E.2d 436 (N.Y. 1973), reversing In re Kimball 40 A.D.2d
252 (N.Y. App. Div. 1973).
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relevant to prove fitness to practice law,, 10 6 even though those acts are
criminalized in Florida.
While these two highest state courts sent a message that gay or
lesbian intimacies had little or no bearing on fitness to practice, the opinions
in each case were short and direct. However, the dissenting opinion in the
lower appellate court in New York (co-authored by two members of the
court), made the reasons quite clear in language and constitutional insight
not in evidence thirteen years later in the opinion by the Bowers majority.
Justices Martuscello and Shapiro wrote for the Appellate Division in 1973:
While the majority avoids the issue of homosexuality and
homosexual acts as a purported badge of unfitness to practice
law, we prefer to meet that issue squarely. To us it seems clear
that the social and moral climate in New York (and probably
throughout the Western World) has in recent years changed
dramatically with respect to homosexuality and consensual
homosexual acts. Today they are generally viewed as no more
indicative of bad character than heterosexuality and consensual
106 Florida Bd. of Bar Exam'r ex rel N.R.S. 403 So. 2d at 1317.
The board may ask the petitioner to respond to further questioning if, in
good faith, it finds a need to assure itself that the petitioner's sexual
conduct is other than non-commercial, private, and between consenting
adults. Otherwise, the board shall certify his admission.
Id.
The dissenting opinions made the quite logical argument (once the premises are
accepted) that the Bar has both the authority and the obligation to pursue the question, where
there has been prior criminality, whether the applicant will continue to violate the criminal
laws of the state. See id. at 1317 (Boyd, J., dissenting); id. at 1318 (Alderman, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Boyd declared:
I am opposed to the admission of any person whose admitted
"orientation" indicates a lifestyle likely to involve routine violation of a
criminal statute .... [This principle should be applied] to any applicant
with an admitted orientation that indicates a lifestyle involving routine
violation of any of those laws which constitute legislative standards of
morality in personal conduct.
Id. at 1318.
Subsequently the Florida Supreme Court ordered on the condition of passage of
the Florida Bar exam, the reinstatement of Harris L. Kimball, the former Florida attorney,
whose Florida disbarment for public sodomy was held by the New York Court of Appeals in
1973 to be insufficient grounds for exclusion from the New York Bar. Fla. Bar ex rel
Petition of Harris L. Kimball for Reinstatement 425 So. 2d 531 (1982), rehearing den. Feb.
7, 1983.
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heterosexual acts. In our opinion, an applicant for admission to
the Bar in New York in 1972 cannot be considered unfit or
lacking the requisite character to practice law, merely because he
is an avowed homosexual."
' 10 7
The footnote in that dissent observed that by that year, there was a
"'changed climate' regarding the morality of homosexual behavior,
[indicated by] the spate of stage shows, movies, TV shows, articles and
books according . . . sympathetic treatment to homosexuals and their
problems as a 'minority' group.
108
That gay and lesbian aspirants to the practice of law presently have
little to fear from Bar examiners and character committees,10 9 is a
conclusion demonstrated by developments perhaps even more persuasive
than the profoundly significant legal and attitudinal changes described in
Part I of this article. It is a conclusion powerfully fortified by the existence
of organizations among the judiciary, 1° among attorneys in numerous
jurisdictions, I II and among law students"12 throughout the country,
dedicated to advancing the legal rights of men and women whose
fulfillment may best be attained by intimate association with those of the
same sex.
107 In re Kimball, 40 A.D.2d at 258 (Martuscello, J., and Shapiro, J., dissenting)
(citations omitted) (emphasis added).
108 Id. at 309.
109 Professor Rhode's conclusions that "some slight possibility of denial" exists
(Rhode, supra note 1, at 539), should be understood as reflecting the year her study was
published-1985. This is not to say that there is no possibility whatsoever of temporary
exclusion of a person convicted of sodomy in a state prohibiting it.
110 E.g., IALGC (The International Association of Lesbian and Gay Judges:
http://home.att.net/-ialgi/).
III E.g., BALIF (Bay Area Lawyers for Individual Freedom); GALLOP (Gay and
Lesbian Lawyers of Philadelphia: http://www.libertynet.org/gallop); GAYLAW (Gay and
Lesbian Attorneys of Washington: http://www.gaylaw.org/main.html); LEGAL (Lesbian and
Gay Law Association of Greater New York: http://www.le-gal.org/); MLGBA
(Massachusetts Lesbian and Gay Bar Association: http://www.mlgba.org/intro.html); NC-
GALA (North Carolina Gay and Lesbian Attorneys: http://www.ncgala.org).
112 E.g., LEGALS (Lesbian and Gay Law Students at SMU Law School); the
University of Southern California Gay and Lesbian Law Union which notes: "[s]everal of the
Law School's deans, faculty members, and administrators are openly gay and lesbian."; HLS
Lambda (Harvard Law School); Outlaws (The Out Law Student Alliance of the University of
Michigan Law School).
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Indeed the American Bar Association itself has adopted several
resolutions making clear its position in favor of laws forbidding
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in employment, housing,
and public accommodations,11 3 and prohibiting the disadvantaging of
homosexuals with regard to adoption,1 4 child custody, and visitation
rights.i5
The Bowers decision, whether or not itself rooted in animus,
legitimated majoritarian animus-i.e., the legislative treatment of
homosexual behavior as morally reprehensible and deserving of criminal
retribution. In Romer, however, animus became an unacceptable basis for
negative treatment of a group. 16 The animus rejected by Romer is what
generates the mistreatment the gay male and the lesbian have suffered in
society-victimization, condemnation, and persecution. The future may be
not too distant, when, rather than serving to justify criminalization and
discrimination against members of a group (whose beliefs and practices are
different or queer), "moral condemnation," standing alone, will be deemed
a constitutionally untenable ground for legal disadvantaging of secularly
harmless behavior.
117
If Bowers is not quite the evil of Dred Scott and Romer is not quite
the courageous effort of Brown to undo such an evil, Bowers will
nevertheless stand as one of the last century's least defensible decisions,
and Romer as an inspiring and visionary reaffirmation of the best of
twentieth-century jurisprudence.
113 The resolution urged "the federal government, the states and local governments
to enact legislation, subject to such exceptions as may be appropriate, prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in employment, housing and public
accommodations," Paul Marcotte, House Affirms Gay Rights: Resolution Provokes Floor
Fight 75 A.B.A. J. 125 (1989).
114 Jeffrey G. Gibson, Lesbian and Gay Prospective Adoptive Parents: The Legal
Battle, 26 Hum. Rts. 7 (1999).
U1 Id
116 And arguably, by strong implication, an unacceptable basis for criminalization
of the practices that virtually determine membership in that group.
117 For an extended and impressive scholarly treatment of the relationship between
Bowers and Romer along similar lines, see Jacobs, supra note 26.
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